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This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and
Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness and probity.
Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average
level of tax evasion (as a measure of ordinary dishonesty) does not differ significantly
between Swedes and Italians. However, we also uncover differences in national “styles”
of dishonesty. Specifically, while Swedes are more likely to be either completely honest
or completely dishonest in their fiscal declarations, Italians are more prone to fudging
(i.e., cheating by a small amount). We discuss the implications of these findings for the
evolution and enforcement of honesty norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Ordinary dishonest behavior rarely attracts much attention. Seemingly innocuous practices such as
avoiding VAT, double parking, cheating on an exam, and dodging fares on public transport tend
to spread, often even in the wake of high-profile, sensationalized scandals. But while such everyday
misdeeds may appear benign, taken together, they can result in vast societal damage (DePaulo et al.,
1996; Ariely, 2008; Feldman, 2009; Ayal and Gino, 2011). In this study, we examine cross-national
variation in individuals’ willingness to engage in ordinary dishonest behavior, as measured by their
tendency to underreport income for tax purposes.
The extent to which citizens engage in tax evasion and tax avoidance varies enormously across
countries (Schneider and Enste, 2013). This is true even within European nations that share
important features such as stable democratic institutions, developed economies, EU membership
and broadly similar tax systems. Part of the reason underlying this cross-national variation relates to
the efficiency of public institutions. Put simply, countries with efficient institutions (with stringent
auditing and financial reporting standards) may be more effective at deterring tax evasion. At the
same time, efficient institutions may encourage higher compliance because citizens feel that they
are receiving something (i.e., high-quality public services) in return for their money (Levi, 1989;
Smith and Stalans, 1991; Smith, 1992; Pommerehne et al., 1994; Edlund, 1999; Frey and Feld, 2002;
Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Cummings et al., 2009; Levi et al., 2009).
However, there is also reason to believe that variation in norms and culture plays an important
role in explaining tax evasion. Consider two European countries that arguably lie at opposite ends
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of the spectrum on tax compliance: Sweden and Italy1.
Even setting aside differences in the institutional environment,
substantial evidence suggests that norms of honesty may
differ between these two countries. Specifically, Swedes think
that honesty is a typical national trait (Daun, 1989), an
assessment shared by other Europeans (Zetterberg, 1995)2. By
contrast, Italy is ranked very low in terms of honesty amongst
European countries, and even Italians themselves consider their
compatriots to be less than trustworthy (Mackie, 2001). In
fact, the Italian journalist and writer Giuseppe Prezzolini once
described Italy as the “country of cunningness” (paese dei furbi),
where people “worship cunningness so much that they even go so
far as to admire those who use it against them” (Prezzolini, 1921).
To what extent can differences in norms and cultures of
(dis)honesty explain cross-national variation in fiscal avoidance
and evasion? To address this question, we report data from a
tax compliance laboratory experiment conducted in Sweden and
Italy in 2013/143. Our experimental framework allows us to hold
fiscal institutions constant, and thereby isolate the influence of
national cultures on individuals’ willingness to pay taxes. Given
prevailing national stereotypes about norms of dishonesty, we
expected that Italians would engage in greater fiscal evasion in
the experiment, compared to Swedes.
To preview our basic findings, our experiment reveals,
somewhat surprisingly, that average levels of tax evasion in
Sweden and Italy do not differ significantly. Yet, we uncover
country-specific styles of dishonesty. More specifically, we find
that Italians engage more frequently in moderately dishonest
behavior, or what Ariely (2012) refers to as “fudging.” By contrast,
Swedes are more likely to be perfectly honest in their behavior,
but among those Swedes who do cheat, they are much more
likely to cheat to the maximum extent possible. In the concluding
section, we discuss some possible implications of Italians’ greater
tendency to fudge for the evolution and enforcement of honesty
norms, with a particular eye toward explaining Italy’s reputation
as a “country of cunningness.”
RELATED WORK
Several previous studies have attempted to evaluate cross-
national variation in cheating and dishonesty using laboratory
experiments. The results have been mixed. On the one hand, a
number of studies have found that the propensity to engage in
dishonest behavior does not diverge significantly across countries
(Gneezy, 2005; Amir et al., 2008; Ariely, 2012; Pascual-Ezama
et al., 2015; but see Dieckmann et al., 2015 for contradictory
results). On the other hand, when honesty and dishonesty are
1One of the most obvious differences between these two countries is revealed in
what is known as the “Tax Gap.” The Tax Gap is a measure of the difference
between revenues actually collected and taxes that would have been collected if
all taxpayers had honestly reported their incomes. While it is difficult to precisely
measure these gaps for obvious reasons, it is widely recognized that the Tax Gap
in Sweden is approximately 8–9% of GDP (Slemrod, 2007), whereas in Italy it can
reach as high as 25% to 30% (Santoro, 2010).
2In a recent YouGov poll, Northern Europeans perceived Sweden as the most
honest nation in the EU (YouGov’s Eurotrack Series, 2013).
3These experiments are part of a larger study on tax compliance behavior in five
countries funded by the European Research Council.
measured in more real life domains (e.g., tax evasion and
bribery scenarios) and framed language is used, systematic and
predictable differences are observed across countries (Alm et al.,
1995; Torgler, 2004; Bobek et al., 2007; Cummings et al., 2009;
Barr and Serra, 2010).
Our study contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we
suggest that national or cultural context can influence behavior
in the lab under some conditions, but not necessarily others. This
is because although honesty norms may differ across societies,
normative considerations may have little effect on behavior if not
first activated by situational cues in the decision context (Cialdini
et al., 1990; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2003; Joly et al., 2008). For
example, although the general norm in my society may be that
“people should not lie,” I could feel perfectly justified in lying
to increase my payoffs in a lab experiment, if I believe that the
operative norm in that specific context is to make as much money
as possible. Given this, it is unsurprising that experiments using
neutral language and context free tasks find little variation in
dishonest behavior across countries (since the relevant country-
specific norms remain dormant), whereas one finds variation
when the specific context is made explicit and the corresponding
norms are activated. For this reason, as we describe below,
we designed our experiment to explicitly incorporate framed
instructions in order to increase the salience of norms against tax
evasion4.
Secondly, we argue that a consideration of “average” country
effectsmay obscure important variation in patterns of dishonesty.
For example, suppose that researchers administer a matrix test to
20 participants, divided evenly between country A and country
B. Suppose further that all 10 participants in country A cheat on
50% of the test questions, while in country B, 5 participants are
completely honest, while 5 participants are completely dishonest.
In this example, “average cheating” is identical across the two
countries, but this average also masks important variation in the
distribution (i.e., the extent and intensity) of dishonest behavior.
In relation to this last point, several studies have documented
heterogeneity in degrees of dishonesty in experimental tasks
(Gneezy et al., 2013). More specifically, one general finding
emerging from the psychology literature is that, when given
opportunities to be dishonest in everyday life, most people are
willing to fudge—that is, to cheat “just a little bit” (Mazar et al.,
2008; Gino et al., 2009; Ayal and Gino, 2011; Ariely, 2012).
The attractiveness of fudging lies in its ability to reduce “ethical
dissonance” by allowing people to recast their transgressions in
4However, as noted by an anonymous reviewer, the use of framed instructions
could introduce an experimenter demand effect: in particular, participants who
wish to “look good” in front of the experimenters may behave more honestly.
As we are interested in cross-national differences in behavior, this demand effect
would be problematic for our analysis only if it also differs across countries.
For example, Italians might care more about “looking good” than Swedes, and
thus moderate the amount by which they cheat on their tax declarations in the
experiment. However, we do not believe that this possibility poses a serious threat
to the validity of our study. In particular, we were careful to ensure from the
very beginning that participants had no knowledge that they were taking part in
a cross-national comparative study. In other words, there is little reason for Italian
(Swedish) participants to feel scrutinized just because they are Italian (Swedish). In
addition, we use only native speakers (indeed, in Italy, only native dialect speakers)
in each laboratory. This should lessen concerns that one needs to “look good” in
front of foreign researchers.
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a more benign light, and thereby reconcile dishonesty with the
desire to maintain a positive moral self-image (Barkan et al.,
2012).
In the context of the foregoing discussion, we are interested in
examining how cross-national variation in social norms relating
to tax evasion shapes both aggregate tax compliance as well as
the tendency to engage in “fiscal fudging.” Accordingly, both of
these considerations—norm specificity and average vs. degrees of
honesty—inform the design and analysis of the present study.
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW
We report results from a tax experiment involving a total of 638
participants in Italy and Sweden (311 in Italy; 327 in Sweden),
recruited in five different locations (Rome, Bologna, Milan,
Stockholm and Gothenburg)5 during the academic year 2013–
20146. The basic design of our experiment is similar to that used
by Alm (1991), and aims to capture some essential features of
the tax system used in many countries: (1) individuals earn real
income, (2) they pay taxes on income voluntarily reported, (3)
they face some chance that unreported taxes will be detected and
penalized, and (4) the total taxes paid are used to provide a public
good.
We describe our experimental protocols in detail below, but
two features of our methodology are worth highlighting up front.
First, our design explicitly provides a “context rich” setting in
which tax language is used throughout. This feature is intended
to ensure that participants’ decisions in the lab reflect their
experiences and social norms pertaining to the specific subject
under study: taxation (Cummings et al., 2009). By contrast, the
standard approach of using neutral language may encourage
participants to perceive the decision problem at hand as a risky
gamble (i.e., the extra income one earns from unreported taxes
weighed against the probability of being caught and fined), as
opposed to a tax compliance decision. An additional benefit of
framing is that there is no ambiguity for participants about what
constitutes honest behavior in the experiment. In other words,
unlike in standard public good games in which participants may
have different expectations about the appropriate amount of
money to contribute, it is clear in the tax frame that the honest
behavior is to declare the total amount earned.
Secondly, in our task, participants are not restricted to being
either completely honest or completely dishonest, but instead, are
allowed to report any amount (from 0 to 100%) of earned income.
Thus, our task allows us to test whether Italians and Swedes differ
5Replicating the experiment in multiple locations within each country provides us
with greater confidence that we are not simply picking up “site-specific” effects,
but rather cross-country differences in patterns of behavior. We chose these five
locations specifically because they were the only active laboratories with suitable
characteristics—i.e. with active participant pools drawn from different fields of
study — that we could find in Sweden and Italy.
6Our experiments have been approved by the IRB Committee at the University
of Colorado, Boulder, where the principal investigator holds a professorship. Our
project has also been approved by the Ethics Council of the European Research
Council, and the European University Institute Ethics committee. Finally, our
work has also been authorized by all of the Italian and Swedish laboratories we
have used, but we did not undergo a separate university-based IRB review in each
case as these were not required by the universities in question. All participants
signed a written consent form prior to taking part in the study.
in their tendency to fudge their taxes, an issue that has not been
carefully investigated in previous work.
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
The experiment consisted of four stages, plus a post-experimental
survey, and lasted 90 minutes on average. In this article, we
report the findings of the first three stages of this experiment7.
In all, we took great care to ensure that the participant pools
were similar in each experimental location8, and that the protocol
was implemented in exactly the same manner in each country
(Appendix Table 1 in the Supplementary Material displays
descriptive statistics for each country sample, as well as the degree
of similarity between Italian and Swedish participants)9.
Each stage began with participants performing a 5 minute
clerical task in which they copied random strings of letters
and numbers from a sheet of paper onto an electronic form.
Participants were paid 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECUs)
for each line of text they correctly copied10. After the clerical
task, participants were shown their earned income and asked
to “report your income for tax purposes” under a variety of
institutional scenarios (described below). Participants were not
informed of how many scenarios would follow or what the
specific content of each scenario might be.
In addition, participants were told that they would face
a 5% probability of being audited in each scenario; if they
underreported their income and were audited, they would
pay a fine equal to twice the tax that they had avoided.
Importantly, we revealed the results of any audits only at
the end of the experiment, to avoid the possibility that being
audited in one round would affect behavior in subsequent
rounds. Moreover, throughout the experiment, participants
had no knowledge of other participants’ performance in the
typing tasks or their tax reporting decisions. This ensured that
individual choices did not reflect reciprocity or conditional
cooperation.
In each of the three stages of the experiment, we manipulated
fiscal rules relevant to different features of modern taxation
systems, in order to elicit behavior under a range of institutional
7These three stages of the experiment encompass nine rounds of tax reporting (see
Appendix Table 7 in the Supplementary Material for a summary). However, we
report data from the first 8 rounds only. The 9th round involves donations to a
real-world charity, and is not central to our research question. In addition, since
the 9th roundwas the final round (and therefore, did not affect behavior in previous
rounds), we have decided to exclude it from the analysis presented in this paper.
8Participants were all recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In early versions
of the experiment, the experimental tasks were programmed and conducted
with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007), and the demographic information was collected
through Qualtrics. Later in our project, we were able to integrate the experimental
and survey portions of the study using our own web-based experimental software.
A summary of the reporting rounds and a text version of the instructions
(translated into English) are included in Appendix Table 7 in the Supplementary
Material and Appendix Supplementary Information 8.
9We also had the protocol translated (double-blind) to ensure that the meanings
of the words and phrases used were consistent across the countries.
10ECUs are converted into real currency at the end of the experiment. One ECU
is worth e0.01 in Italy, and 0.60 SEK in Sweden. These exchange rates are chosen
based on the average hourly pay rates in each country. The average earnings were
14.09 Euros in Italy and 187.60 SEK in Sweden.
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contexts11. In stage 1, we altered the amount that participants
received in return for the taxes that they collectively paid. In
the first scenario (round 1) of stage 1, participants were simply
told that the tax rate is 30%. There was no redistribution of tax
revenues. In the second scenario (round 2), the tax rate remained
30%, but all tax revenues were placed in a “general fund”
which was subsequently divided equally among all participants
irrespective of how much each individual paid into the fund.
In the third scenario (round 3), we again held the tax rate at
30%, but all tax revenues in the general fund were doubled and
then redistributed equally to all participants, regardless of how
much each participant had individually paid into the fund. In
each round (before they were asked to report their incomes),
subjects were given multiple specific examples demonstrating the
rules in each scenario under a series of hypothetical decisions (see
Appendix Supplementary Information 8 in the Supplementary
Material); they were also reminded of the 5% probability of being
audited, as well as of the fine they would have to pay should the
audit detect any under-reporting.
In stage 2, we held redistribution constant and varied the
tax rates. In the first scenario of stage 2 (round 4), we asked
participants to report their income under a tax rate of 10%. In
the second scenario (round 5), the tax rate was increased to
30%, and in the third scenario (round 6), the tax rate was again
increased to 50%. In all three rounds of stage 2, we held the
audit rate (5%), fines (2x underreported income) and the rules
for redistribution (tax revenues doubled and then redistributed)
constant.
11We also considered randomly ordering the scenarios to control for order effects.
However, we decided that this option was unnecessary because our central concern
is not to evaluate the effects of institutional changes, but rather to examine how
people in different countries would respond to the same institutional scenarios.
Finally, in stage 3, we presented scenarios with two different
types of progressive taxation schemes. In round 7, the top 10%
of income earners (as defined by self reported income) faced a
50% tax rate; participants in the bottom 10% of reported incomes
faced a 10% rate; finally, the middle 80% of reported income
earners faced a 30% rate. By contrast, in round 8, we introduced a
marginal tax rate system (similar to the real tax systems operating
in Italy and Sweden). In this case, all subjects paid a 10% tax
on the first 50 ECUs of reported income, a 30% tax on reported
income between 51 and 100 ECUs, and a 50% tax on all reported
income above 100 ECUs. In both progressive taxation rounds, all
tax revenues were doubled and then redistributed, and we held
the audit rate constant at 5%. Once again, subjects were given
explicit examples to ensure their understanding of the rules.
RESULTS
Average Compliance Rate
Despite the intrinsic social dilemma structure of the tax scenario
that makes evasion the optimal strategy, we find that the level of
compliance far exceeded the level predicted by expected utility
theory (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) in both
countries and in all rounds. This result is consistent with previous
research on tax compliance and public goods (Ledyard, 1995;
Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Cummings et al., 2009; Alm, 2012).
Pooling both countries, we observe that individuals were mostly
honest, reporting on average 64.9% of total income.
Additionally, we observe that the reporting rate varied
according to the specific scenarios presented in each round.
Figure 1 shows the average percentage of earned income that
was reported in each of the eight rounds, broken down between
Swedish and Italian participants. The vertical axis displays
FIGURE 1 | Average compliance rate divided by round and by country.
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the average tax compliance rate, defined as the percentage of
total earned income that is truthfully declared in each round.
Comparing rounds 1 through 3, we see that compliance responds
positively to the efficiency of redistribution: individuals were
willing to declare more when they knew that tax revenues
produced more public goods. Secondly, individuals responded to
higher tax rates by evading their fiscal obligations: compliance
falls moving from rounds 4 through 6. These results are in line
with previous experimental studies on tax compliance (Alm et al.,
1992; Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Torgler, 2002; Blackwell, 2007;
Alm, 2012), providing us with some assurance about the validity
of our experimental design.
Turning to the cross-country variation in average compliance
rates, although we predicted that Swedes would comply more on
average than Italians, we do not document significant differences
across countries. Pooling across all 8 rounds of the experiment,
Italians reported 63.1% of their earned income (s.e. = 1.8%),
as compared to Swedes who reported 66.6% (s.e. = 1.9%),
and the cross-country difference is only 3.5% (t-test s.e. =
2.6%, p = 0.182). We run several additional tests to assess
the robustness of this result. First, we check whether different
locations within each country can indeed be pooled to estimate a
larger “country” effect. To do so, in Models 1 and 2 of Appendix
Table 2 in the Supplementary Material, we estimate individual-
level tobit models for the average compliance rate (pooled across
all 8 rounds) with site-specific dummy variables, separately
for Italy and Sweden12. We also cluster standard errors by
experimental session. We find no statistically significant within-
country variability, suggesting that the results from different
locations can indeed be pooled.
Next, we put data from both countries together, and estimate
the effect of a dummy variable for Italian participants on the
average compliance rate, controlling for a host of individual-
level characteristics including gender, age, previous participation
in experiments, economics training, earnings in the clerical
task, and beliefs about the honesty of other participants. In
an alternative specification, we also add fixed effects for the
individual treatment round. The inclusion of covariates in
Models 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 2 in the Supplementary
Material allows us to examine individual-level correlates of tax
evasion and dishonesty. We observe that the average compliance
rate is lower amongst men, and amongst younger participants
(although this latter result is less robust), which is consistent with
previous research (Hasseldine, 1999; Lewis et al., 2009; Torgler
and Valev, 2010). Risk aversion is also correlated with higher
average compliance13. In addition, in line with previous work,
we find a positive correlation between economics training and
12The number of observations changes once we include demographic covariates
in our regression models. This is because in early versions of the experiment,
the experimental tasks were implemented in zTree, while the demographic
information was collected separately usingQualtrics. This necessitated participants
entering their anonymous participant-IDs twice: once into zTree, and once
again into Qualtrics. Because some participants accidentally entered different
participant-IDs into the two systems, we were unable to match their experimental
decisions with their demographic data. This problem was fixed in later versions of
the experiment, once we switched to our own web-based experimental software.
13Wemeasured risk using a survey item that asks subjects to rank themselves on a
10-point scale, with 1 signifying a person who “normally tries to avoid taking risks”
lower average compliance (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Carter and
Irons, 1991; Cullis et al., 2006; Lewis et al., 2009). Finally, we
control for participants’ beliefs about the behavior of others in
the experiment14. Individuals who believed that others reported
less also reported less themselves (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
Importantly, the inclusion of these covariates does not change
our overall conclusions regarding cross-country differences in
the average compliance rate. As shown in Models 3 and 4, the
coefficient on the Italy dummy is never statistically significant.
These additional results confirm our initial findings reported
above: regardless of the controls and model specification we
employ, we do not find any significant differences in average
compliance rates between the two countries15.
Patterns of Compliance and Dishonesty
Although an analysis of the average compliance rate does not
support prevailing national stereotypes that Swedes are more
honest than Italians, a closer analysis of the distribution of
compliance decisions yields some interesting cross-national
differences. In particular, a statistic like the average compliance
rate does not allow us to distinguish between three different
decisions: complete compliance (i.e., the decision to declare 100%
of earned income), complete evasion (i.e., the decision to declare
0% of earned income), and partial compliance or “fudging” (i.e.,
the decision to declare more than 0, but less than the total; see
also Mazar et al., 2008 for a similar analysis).
These distinctions are shown in Figure 2, which displays the
distribution of participants’ reported incomes (pooled across
all 8 rounds). The x-axis breaks down the distribution of
reported incomes into the following bins: [0%, (1–10%), (11–
20%). . . (91–99%), 100%], and the y-axis displays the percentage
of participants in each country falling into each bin. We observe
that Swedes tended to concentrate in the extreme bins (0% and
100%), while the distribution is more uniform amongst Italians.
To more precisely operationalize these patterns, we define the
following three “types” of participants:
• Honest Type: declares 100% of earned income across all 8
rounds.
• Dishonest Type: declares 0% of earned income across all 8
rounds.
• Fudging Type: everyone else.
Next, we compare the distribution of types across Italy and
Sweden. We find more Honest Types in Sweden compared to
Italy (25.7% in Sweden vs. 14.8% in Italy; Schlag z-test p < 0.001),
but also more Dishonest Types (8.9% in Sweden vs. 5.1% in Italy;
Schlag z-test p = 0.066). By contrast, significantly more Italians
are classified as Fudging Types (80% in Italy vs. 65% in Sweden;
and 10 signifying someone who is “completely willing to take risks.” Answers have
been standardized to have mean= 0 and s.d.= 1.
14We measured participants’ perceptions a survey item which asks subjects
whether they thought other participants in the experiment reported (a) their entire
earned incomes, (b) less than their entire earned incomes, or (c) much less than
their entire earned incomes. In our regressions, we use (b) as our baseline category.
15As a further robustness check, we compared country-level differences in average
compliance rates separately for each individual round of the experiment. In 6 out of
the 8 rounds, we found no statistically significant differences (see Appendix Table
3 in the Supplementary Material).
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FIGURE 2 | Distribution of individual compliance rates.
Schlag z-test p < 0.001). In other words, Swedish participants
displayed more clear-cut behaviors: Swedes cheat less frequently,
but when they cheat, they are likely to do so completely. By
contrast, Italians cheat more habitually, but the intensity of their
cheating is more restrained: they hold back from “cheating all
they way.”
Interestingly, we also find that, compared to Dishonest Types,
Fudging Types are also more likely to deceive (themselves) about
their behavior during the experiment. In particular, in our post-
experimental survey, participants were asked to indicate how
much of their total earnings they themselves reported during
the experiment: 18% of Fudging Types indicating that they
reported their total income, while no Dishonest Types lied. This
last finding nicely fits with evidence from social psychological
research showing that individuals choose fudging strategies to
maintain a positive moral reputation and self-image (Ayal and
Gino, 2011; Ariely, 2012).
To check the robustness of these results, we conduct an
additional battery of tests. First, as before, we verify that results
from separate locations within countries can indeed be pooled
(Models 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 4 in the Supplementary
Material)16. Next, we estimate probit models of the probability
of being a Fudging Type, conditional upon individual-level
covariates and round fixed effects (Models 3 and 4 of Appendix
Table 4 in the Supplementary Material). In all specifications,
Italians were approximately 10% more likely to fudge, compared
to Swedes. Here, we also find that individuals who believed that
16The percentage of Fudging Types in all Italian locations is higher than in all
Swedish locations (83% in Milan, 74% in Bologna and 84% in Rome vs. 67% in
Stockholm and 62% in Gothenburg). Running an “empty” random-effects model,
we find that the variance within countries is about half the size of the variance
across countries.
others behaved honestly in the experiment were significantly less
likely to fudge17,18.
In summary, although the average level of dishonesty does
not differ across the two countries, a closer examination of the
data reveals a cross-national difference in patterns of dishonesty.
Simply put: Italians are more prone to “fudging” than Swedes.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
Our results indicate that when Italians and Swedes face a tax
compliance scenario consisting of a transparent tax system,
efficient redistributive regime, and clear audit rules and penalties,
the average level of honesty is relatively high in both countries.
This result does not bear out our initial expectations based
on national stereotypes, where we predicted a greater level of
honesty in Sweden compared to Italy. However, we also identify
an interesting cross-country difference that may shed light on our
understanding of why these stereotypes emerge. In particular, we
find country-specific styles of dishonesty, with Italians engaging
more frequently in fudging, while Swedes were more likely to be
both perfectly honest and perfectly dishonest. In this concluding
section, we offer some conjectures linking this result to the
17We also check whether our results are sensitive to the definition of fudging
we employ. Specifically, we alternatively redefine Fudging Types as those who
reported (a) more than 2/3rds of their income, (b) between 1/3rd and 2/3rds of total
income, and (c) less than 1/3rd of total income. Overall, as shown in Appendix
Table 5 in the Supplementary Material, we find that regardless of the definition of
Fudging Type, Italians were more likely fudge.
18We also checked for cross-country differences in the distribution of types
separately for each individual round.We find that in all 8 rounds of the experiment,
Italians were significantly more likely to fudge than Swedes (See Appendix Table 6
in the Supplementary Material).
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development and perpetuation of national stereotypes about
honesty and dishonesty in Sweden and Italy.
In particular, we argue that when ordinary dishonesty takes
on the form of fudging, this behavior may be particularly
difficult to control and eradicate. Part of the reason stems
from the fact that fudging introduces a degree of moral
ambiguity in judging the wrongfulness of a particular action. As
discussed in Ayal and Gino (2011), when the categorization of
a behavior is malleable rather than clear-cut, people are more
likely to conceptualize their own actions in acceptable terms.
This benevolent interpretation of dishonest behavior helps to
reduce any dissonance that may result from the tension between
unethical conduct and the desire to maintain a moral self-image
(Baumeister, 1998; Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002). Fudging thus
provides individuals with greater moral license to indulge in
(moderate) wrongdoing.
In addition, in the presence of widespread fudging, it may
be difficult for third parties to enforce honesty norms. In
particular, when there is uncertainty about what is right or
wrong, punishment becomes more risky, since enforcement may
generate counter-punishment (also from third-party observers)
who do not recognize the legitimacy of the punisher (Herrmann
et al., 2008; Strimling and Eriksson, 2014). As such, tolerance for
(moderate) wrongdoing rises.
Given the difficulties that fudging poses for both self-
regulation and peer-regulation of dishonest behavior, ordinary
dishonesty tends to spread. This may explain why Italians have
such a widespread reputation for cunningness, as they are
observed both to engage in ubiquitous small acts of dishonesty,
and to tolerate and even justify dishonesty on the part of others.
By contrast, Swedes’ relatively clear-cut behaviors may facilitate
both self-regulation (as it is more difficult to self-justify gross
dishonesty) and social control.
Efforts to raise the moral standard of society in the presence
of fudging may thus require actions that (a) increase awareness
of the negative effects of apparently benign behaviors, and
(b) support norms enforcers who insist on absolute honesty.
In future work, we propose to use agent-based modeling and
additional experiments to explore the dynamics of fudging, its
social effects, and the effectiveness of policy interventions to
foster greater public integrity.
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